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The best rewards are often distant and can only be achieved by planning and decision-
making over several steps. We designed a multi-step choice task in which monkeys followed 
internal plans to save rewards towards self-defined goals. During this self-controlled 
behavior, amygdala neurons showed future-oriented activity that reflected the animal’s 
plan to obtain specific rewards several trials ahead. This prospective activity encoded 
crucial components of the animal’s plan, including value and length of the planned choice 
sequence. It began on initial trials when a plan would be formed, reappeared step-by-step 
until reward receipt, and readily updated with a new sequence. It predicted performance, 
including errors, and typically disappeared during instructed behavior. Such prospective 
activity could underlie the formation and pursuit of internal plans characteristic for goal-
directed behavior. The existence of neuronal planning activity in the amygdala suggests an 
important role for this structure in guiding behavior towards internally generated, distant 
goals.  
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The pursuit of distant rewards through planned behavior is a key function of the primate brain. 
As monkeys search their large habitats for the best foods, humans plan their careers towards the 
benefits of future rewards. Although planned, goal-directed behaviors can differ in timescale—
from foraging across food patches to human economic saving—psychological and economic 
theories suggest a common principle
1-3
: the formation of an internal plan to obtain a distant goal, 
and its subsequent pursuit over several steps. In the present study, we investigated the neuronal 
mechanisms for reward-based planning by combining the advanced behavioral capacities of non-
human primates with single-neuron recordings.  
Planning functions have traditionally been ascribed to the frontal lobe
4-6
. Indeed, 
neurophysiological experiments have provided detailed accounts of frontal lobe activity during 
generation, execution and updating of movement plans
7-10
. Neuronal activity in frontal lobe and 
connected basal ganglia also precedes self-initiated movements
11-14
, which constitute the 
effective means for carrying out a plan. Despite these advances, a fundamental question has 
remained unanswered: as planned behavior is typically motivated by the prospect of reward, 
what are the neural processes for directing action plans towards internally defined, distant reward 
goals? 
We addressed this question by recording the activity of single neurons in the amygdala, a 
nuclear structure in the medial temporal lobe implicated in reward and emotion
15-22
 with inputs to 
frontal lobe-basal ganglia systems involved in action planning
23
. We hypothesized that amygdala 
neurons might show planning activity related to internally generated reward goals and their 
value. 
In addition to its well-known roles in emotion, the amygdala is an important component 
of the reward system
15,16,20
. In animals, amygdala neurons encode the value of sensory 
stimuli
15,21,22,24,25
 and amygdala lesions impair reward-guided behaviors
16,17,26,27
. The human 
amygdala also processes rewards
18,28
 and reward-based decisions
18,29,30
, and amygdala damage is 
associated with decision impairments
31,32
. Accordingly, current theories view the amygdala as an 
associative learning and valuation system that regulates affective, cognitive and autonomic 
processes as well as decisions and behavior
15-19,21
. However, the amygdala’s role in the pursuit of 
internally defined, distant rewards through planned behavior is still unexplored. 
Here we show that during planned behavior, the primate brain generates future-oriented 
activity related to self-defined goals, which persists until a distant reward is received. We 
4 
 
recorded the activity of amygdala neurons while monkeys produced choice sequences to save 
rewards over several steps towards internal goals. We found amygdala neurons with prospective 
activity that reflected the animal’s plan to obtain specific rewards by saving for a given number 
of steps. In different neurons, the activity reflected crucial components of the animal’s plan, 
including the subjective value of the current plan (‘sequence value’) and the planned number of 
saving steps (‘sequence length’). This planning activity began before the animal initiated a 
saving sequence and reoccurred with each step during pursuit of the plan, as the animal 
progressed towards reward. Such prospective neuronal activity seems suited to guide planned 
behavior over multiple steps towards distant reward goals. 
 
RESULTS 
Sequential reward-saving task 
 Two monkeys performed in a sequential reward-saving task in which they could follow 
internal plans towards obtaining reward at the end of a sequence of trials. On each trial (i.e. each 
step within a sequence) the animals freely chose to save juice reward for future consumption or 
spend the already saved amount (Fig. 1a). Consecutive save choices increased the available juice 
amount as determined by a given ‘interest rate’ (Fig. 1b, green, Eq. 1). Choices were made by a 
saccade towards the save or spend cue; pre-trained save cues indicated current interest rate. The 
animals freely determined the length of each saving sequence. This self-controlled and sequential 
task design allowed the animals to plan their behavior over multiple trials and anticipate final 
rewards more than 100 s in advance (up to 9 consecutive trials with ~12 s cycle time). 
Randomized cue positions precluded planning of left-right action sequences. To confirm the 
internal nature of planning, we also tested externally instructed ‘imperative’ save-spend 
sequences with comparable lengths. 
Our task incorporated two key aspects of economic saving
1
: the internal formation of a 
plan to obtain a distant reward goal, and its pursuit over sequential choices. The final reward in a 
saving sequence corresponded to the animal’s goal, and the sequence length corresponded to the 
means by which to achieve the goal. These features made the saving task a suitable model to 
investigate reward-based planning and goal pursuit
1-3
.  
As economic choices critically depend on value, testing the hypothesis of planning 
activity in reward neurons required us to determine the subjective values that the animals 
5 
 
associated with specific saving plans. These values depended not only on final reward amounts 
but also on expenditure related to sequence length: because higher rewards typically required 
longer sequences (determined by the current interest rate, Fig. 1b green), their value was 
compromised by temporal delay and physical effort. To capture these factors in a direct manner, 
we followed the general notion of standard economic choice theory that estimates subjective 
values from behavioral choices. We derived the value of different saving sequences by 
calculating the relative frequency with which the animals produced each sequence length within 
a given interest rate (Fig. 1b, black bars). Accordingly, for a given interest rate, a sequence had a 
higher subjective value if the animal chose it more frequently than other sequences. To account 
for reward magnitude differences between interest rates, choice frequencies for different 
sequences were weighted by associated reward magnitudes (Fig. 1b, green curves). Subjective 
values determined in this manner constituted a decision variable for the animals which we call 
‘sequence value’ (i.e. the subjective value associated with a given saving sequence, Fig. 1b, 
magenta curves). 
Sequence value differed from final reward magnitude as it was a non-monotonic function 
of sequence length; the shape of the value function depended on the relative frequency with 
which a sequence was chosen (Fig. 1b, magenta curves). By contrast, final reward magnitude 
increased monotonically with sequence length (Fig. 1b, green curves). Because sequence values 
were derived from the animals’ relative choice frequencies, they effectively incorporated benefits 
related to reward amounts as well as expenditure related to waiting times and physical effort. 
Typically, sequence value functions increased with sequence length up to a peak, and then 
decreased with longer sequences that the animal chose less frequently, likely due to temporal 
discounting and physical effort cost. This non-linearity in value functions made it possible to 
distinguish neuronal coding of subjective sequence value from objective sequence length and 
reward magnitude. To control for valuations of save and spend choice options on single trials we 
also defined trial-by-trial subjective values (‘spend value’ and ‘save value’, Eq. 2,3, see 
Methods).  
 
Behavioral data 
Figure 1b shows the animals’ relative choice frequencies for different saving sequences, 
calculated for different interest rate conditions. The animals saved more when interest was high: 
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mean saving lengths increased with higher interest rates (P = 0.003, linear regression, Fig. 1b,c, 
black, Supplementary Fig. 1a). Typically, at the beginning of a testing session, the animals 
adapted to the current interest rate within a few trials (Supplementary Fig. 1b). For interest 
rates with different rates of reward return, the animals’ behavior approximated optimality by 
maximizing reward rate (Supplementary Fig. 1c,d). Control experiments confirmed that the 
animals adjusted their behavior even when interest changed without notification and tracked 
accumulated reward over consecutive trials (Fig. 1c, magenta; Supplementary Fig. 1e,f). Thus, 
saving was adaptive and internally controlled. It did not simply reflect conditioned or automated 
behavior.  
To confirm that the animals planned saving sequences in advance, we examined trial-by-
trial reaction times. Mean reaction times were shorter on spend trials compared to save trials 
(Fig. 1d, black vs. magenta data, z = –48.57, P = 1.0 × 10–10, Wilcoxon test), suggesting higher 
motivation for immediately upcoming rewards. Reactions on spend trials were also faster after 
longer saving sequences, i.e. when the animals would obtain higher rewards (Fig. 1d black, r = –
0.85, P = 0.007, linear regression), which demonstrated that the animals tracked internally the 
accumulated reward and were more motivated for higher amounts. Critically, reactions across 
consecutive save trials within a sequence, while the animals progressed towards their current 
goal, also depended on final sequence length, with faster reactions during longer sequences (r = 
–0.81, P = 0.009, Fig. 1d magenta). This suggested that the animals anticipated final reward 
outcomes several trials in advance, consistent with internally planned, goal-directed saving.  
To confirm the behavioral importance of subjective values, we regressed trial-by-trial 
save-spend choices on subjective values using logistic regression (Eq. 4). ‘Spend value’ reflected 
the subjective value expected from spending on the current trial , whereas ‘save value’ reflected 
the average value expected in all future trials of the current saving sequence. Our main planning 
variable ‘sequence value’ corresponded to the spend value on the final trial of a sequence (i.e. the 
spend value actually chosen); accordingly, its influence on choice was captured by the spend 
value regressor. We used independent behavioral data for deriving subjective values (n = 5,600 
trials) and for estimating logistic regression coefficients (n = 5,933 trials). 
Logistic regression identified subjective values as main explanatory variables for saving 
behavior (Fig. 1e): higher spend values decreased the likelihood of saving on the current trial 
(negative beta in Fig. 1e), whereas higher save values increased saving (positive beta in Fig. 1e). 
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A stepwise logistic regression confirmed these results by selecting the key variables spend value 
and save value (both P < 10
–16
). Regressing trial-by-trial reaction times on subjective values 
confirmed and extended these results: reaction times reflected subjective values with faster 
responses for higher sequence values (P = 0.001, multiple linear regression, Eq.5, 
Supplementary Fig. 2a,b), even as early as the initial saving trial (P = 0.004). Similar results 
were obtained from analysis of licking durations in animal A (Supplementary Fig. 2c).  
Taken together, behavioral data confirmed subjective valuation of trial-by-trial choices, 
saving sequences, and final reward goals, consistent with internally planned saving. 
 
Planning activity in amygdala neurons: single neuron data 
While the animals saved rewards step-by-step towards self-defined goals, a striking group 
of amygdala neurons signaled the animals’ internal saving plans multiple trials in advance. We 
refer to such prospective activity as ‘planning activity’ because its occurrence preceded the end 
of a saving sequence by several steps, and because it referred to a future event that was self-
determined by the animal and existed only internally at the time of saving. Planning activity in 
different neurons reflected different components of the animal’s plan: the subjective value of the 
planned sequence (‘sequence value’) or the planned number of saving steps (‘sequence length’). 
Selection criteria for neurons with planning activity were task-related activity (P < 0.01, 
Wilcoxon test) and a significant regression coefficient for sequence value or sequence length (P 
< 0.05, multiple regression analysis, Eq. 6–9). 
The neuron in Fig. 2 had phasic trial-by-trial activity during the fixation period that was 
highest during sequences in which the animal would eventually spend on the fifth trial, and lower 
for shorter or longer sequences (Fig. 2a). This activity profile resembled closely the distribution 
of sequence values derived from the animal’s choice preferences (Fig. 2a magenta curve): for 
this interest rate, five-trial sequences had the highest value as the animal chose them most 
frequently. Within trials, the prospective activity appeared during ocular fixation and continued 
beyond the cue period when a save-spend choice was made (Fig. 2b). Linear regression indicated 
a better relationship to sequence value (r
2 
= 0.54, P = 1.4 × 10
–8
, n = 40, Fig. 2c) than to 
sequence length (r
2 
= 0.21, P = 0.003) or final juice amount (r
2 
= 0.07, P = 0.09). Multiple 
regression confirmed a relationship between neuronal activity and sequence value (P = 3.8 × 10
–
6
, Eq. 6) and factored out other variables, including subjective values related to single trial 
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choices (P > 0.05, Fig. 2d, Supplementary Fig. 3). The relationship between activity and 
sequence value disappeared in externally cued trials when saving was instructed (Fig. 2e, P > 
0.05, multiple regression), despite comparable behavioral outcome anticipation (regression of 
sequence length on reaction times: P < 0.05; Supplementary Fig. 2d). Thus, during internally 
controlled step-by-step saving, the neuron showed prospective activity related to the subjective 
value of the animal’s saving plan. 
We found different forms of planning activity as illustrated in Fig. 3 for four single 
amygdala neurons. The neuron in Fig. 3a resembled the one in Fig. 2 as it signaled sequence 
value across all trials (P = 0.04, n = 53, multiple regression). In addition, it encoded spend values 
on single trials (Fig. 3a right). To be engaged in planned saving, amygdala neurons should also 
encode the initial setting of a plan, which may occur as early as the first trial of a sequence. This 
is exactly what we observed for the neuron in Fig. 3b. This neuron encoded sequence value 
specifically on the first trial of each sequence (Fig. 3a,b, bold colors) but not on subsequent trials 
(light colors). In this neuron, planning activity occurred early on at trial start before fixation. 
Multiple regression confirmed a parametric value signal (P = 5.9 × 10
–4
, n = 42, Fig. 3b right), 
which differed distinctly from categorical coding of sequence onset previously found in 
amygdala neurons during an instructed task
33
. Accordingly, this neuron encoded the prospective 
valuation of an internal saving plan, well before the animal implemented the plan.  
Sequence value neurons signaled the value of the animal’s plan but not the required steps 
for its implementation. By contrast, the neurons in Fig. 3c,d encoded the planned number of 
choice steps for a given sequence, i.e. the planned sequence length. The neuron in Fig. 3c 
showed planning activity that predicted the sequence length the animal would eventually 
produce. It encoded sequence length throughout all trials in a sequence (P = 0.0032, multiple 
regression, n = 41) with higher activity for shorter sequences. The neuron in Fig. 3d also 
encoded sequence length but it did so specifically on initial trials (P = 0.0049, multiple 
regression, n = 40), with higher activity predicting longer sequences. Thus, sequence length 
neurons encoded the animal’s internal plan in terms of the required number of saving steps. 
Taken together, prospective activity in amygdala neurons encoded crucial components of 
the animal’s saving plan, including subjective value and objective length of the planned 
sequence. Such planning activities occurred either on initial trials or throughout whole saving 
sequences. 
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Planning activity in amygdala neurons: population data 
Among 329 task-related neurons, 123 (37%, 66/57 from animal A/B) showed planning 
activity related to sequence value or sequence length, either throughout saving sequences or 
specifically on initial trials (Fig. 4a–d, Table 1, Supplementary Tables 1–3, Supplementary 
Fig. 4). The average activity of sequence value neurons followed closely the average subjective 
value profile, which was a non-monotonic function of sequence length (r
2 
= 0.91, P<0.0001, 
linear regression; compare magenta curve and black bars in Fig. 4b). Analysis of trial-by-trial 
activity in these neurons confirmed this effect (P = 2.2 × 10
–15
, partial correlation factored out 
sequence length). By contrast, activity of sequence length neurons increased linearly with 
sequence length (r
2 
= 0.85, P = 0.0035, linear regression, Fig. 4d). Analysis of trial-by-trial 
activity in these neurons confirmed this effect (P = 7.4 × 10
–5
, partial correlation factored out 
sequence value). Supplementary analysis confirmed a graded, parametric representation of 
sequence value or sequence length, rather than sharp tuning to specific sequences 
(Supplementary Fig. 5). A subset of neurons with planning activity was tested in the imperative 
task. In most of them (53/57, 93%), planning activity was not found when saving was externally 
instructed (Fig. 4e,f). Thus, planning activity appeared to be largely specific for internally 
controlled saving behavior. 
Although planning activity often occurred without coding of other variables, some 
planning activities reflected additional task-related variables for guiding behavior on single trials 
(Supplementary Table 2), including previously reported trial-by-trial save-spend choices
34
.  
Additional tests confirmed the statistical significance of planning activity. Compared to 
randomly shuffled data, the distribution of regression coefficients for planning activity was 
shifted towards higher positive and negative values (Fig. 4g, P = 1.8 × 10
–27
, Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test). The observed proportion of planning activities exceeded that expected by chance 
(P < 10
–62
, binomial probability test); less than five percent of coefficients from shuffled data 
were significant. Using alternative regression models (see Methods, Supplementary Table 1), 
we found that the number of identified neurons with planning activity depended little on the 
specific model used and on the inclusion of different control covariates: the number of neurons 
with planning activity over several alternative models varied by less than 5% compared to our 
main models, with percentages ranging from 35% to 41% (our original analysis resulted in 37%). 
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Thus, planning variables explained unique variance components in neuronal activity relative to 
other variables. 
Histological reconstructions verified that the recording sites were restricted to the 
amygdala and covered basolateral and centromedial regions (Fig. 4h, Supplementary Fig. 6). 
Although neurons with planning activity were found in both basolateral and centromedial 
amygdala, they occurred significantly more frequently in the basolateral complex (χ21 = 7.86, P = 
0.005, χ2-test Fig. 4i). A similar clustering was not found for other types of activities, including 
those reflecting current-trial save-spend choices (P > 0.05, χ2-test). This anatomical trend could 
indicate relatively greater importance of the basolateral amygdala for planned reward-saving. 
 
Adaptation dynamics of planning activity 
If a neuron encoded components of the animals’ saving plan, its activity should update 
once a sequence is completed and begin to reflect properties of the subsequent sequence. 
Accordingly, we examined sequence transitions by comparing activity on spend trials and 
subsequent save trials (the last and first trials of two successive sequences). Figure 5a illustrates 
such transitions in a single neuron with planning activity related to sequence length. Transitions 
(dashed vertical lines) were marked by activity changes that scaled with changes in planned 
sequence length (compare thick gray and green lines). The neuron’s activity reflected planned 
sequence length within sequences (Fig. 5b left) and changes in planned sequence lengths at 
transitions (Fig. 5b middle). Activity was unrelated to within-sequence reward proximity (trials 
until reward, Fig. 5b right). Sequence-by-sequence adaptation was also evident in population 
activity (Fig. 5c, left and middle). Thus, planning activity adapted sequence-by-sequence to 
reflect changes in the animals’ internal plan. 
The observed sequence-by-sequence updating differs substantially from sustained activity 
increases typically associated with reward expectation
20
. In control analyses, population activity 
was unrelated to within-sequence reward proximity (Fig. 5c right, r = 0.06, P = 0.1, linear 
regression) and few individual planning activities reflected reward proximity (12/123, 10%; 
supplementary regression with reward proximity covariate, Fig. 5d) or reward expectation 
indexed by reaction times (11/123 responses, 9%; supplementary regression with reaction times 
covariate). Thus, most planning activities were insensitive to trial-by-trial reward proximity and 
reward expectation. 
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Sequence value neurons were of particular interest, for they allowed us to test whether 
planning activity at the start of a testing session was in-step with behavior as the animal adapted 
to current interest rate. We defined criteria for behavioral and neuronal adaptation, and plotted 
the number of steps to criterion (Fig. 5e, upper panel). On average, as soon as the animal chose 
its preferred sequence, activity began to accurately reflect the sequence’s current value (Fig. 5e, 
compare black and magenta curves). In most cases, planning activity reflected sequence value 
accurately on the first time the preferred sequence was chosen (Fig. 5e, black). Thus, amygdala 
sequence value neurons adapted in-step with the animals’ behavior.  
 
Planning activity predicts performance, including errors 
If planning activity in the amygdala participated in guiding the animals’ behavior, it 
should fluctuate with behavioral performance. We tested this hypothesis by regressing a measure 
of the animals’ reward-saving efficiency on the standardized neuronal regression coefficients for 
sequence value and sequence length. We measured reward-saving efficiency as the accumulated 
sequence value per unit time, which indicated the extent to which the animals maximized 
subjective value. Across neuronal responses, stronger planning activity in a given testing session 
predicted more efficient reward-saving (r = 0.39, P = 2.9 ×10
–5
, linear regression, Fig. 6a). This 
relationship remained highly significant after factoring out alternative variables, including 
interest rate, juice amount, error rate, number of trials, and reward range (P < 0.001, partial 
correlation). Thus, the strength of planning activity in amygdala neurons explained variation in 
the animals’ saving efficiency. 
We also tested whether planning activity tracked fluctuations in behavior as indexed by 
errors in trial-by-trial performance. In a population analysis, we regressed neuronal activity on 
sequence value and sequence length separately for trials on which the animals committed 
errors—which implied failure to progress towards rewards—and for the immediately preceding 
and following non-error trials. Just before error trials, population activity exhibited a significant 
relationship to planning variables (Fig. 6b, ‘Pre-error). However, this relationship declined when 
the animals committed an error (‘Error’), and subsequently reappeared when they resumed 
saving towards their current goal (‘Post-error’). Thus, planning activity transiently declined on 
error trials, thereby reflecting performance fluctuations within a testing session. 
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DISCUSSION 
We found prospective activity in amygdala neurons that reflected the animal’s plan to save 
rewards towards specific goals several trials ahead. This activity predicted behavior not for 
individual trials but for whole choice sequences. In different neurons, it coded the subjective 
value of the planned choice sequence (sequence value) or the objective number of planned 
saving steps (sequence length). Crucially, saving plans were not signaled by the environment but 
were self-defined and existed only internally. Accordingly, such activities constitute the neuronal 
building blocks of an internal behavioral plan. The occurrence of planning activity on initial 
trials and throughout saving sequences matches the timing of key cognitive processes thought to 
underlie goal-directed behavior
1-3
: the formation of a plan and its subsequent pursuit. In many 
neurons, the disappearance of prospective activity during instructed trials, activity updating in-
step with the animals’ behavior, absence of reward proximity coding, and relationship to 
performance provided further evidence for the encoding of an internal plan. By encoding the 
central components of a plan to obtain a future reward, prospective amygdala neurons may 
participate in guiding self-controlled behavior over several steps towards distant goals. 
  
Functional significance of planning activity 
Neurons in different brain structures encode reward values based on external cues and 
reinforcement history
20,21,35-42
. Although important components of value coding, such activities 
by themselves could not guide sequential behavior towards internal, distant goals. By contrast, 
the presently observed sequence value signals seem ideally suited for this purpose—they 
reflected the value of the animal’s current plan, appeared several trials before a reward goal was 
obtained, reoccurred at each choice step until reward receipt, and fluctuated with performance. 
Such value-related planning activity in the amygdala could serve in the guidance of behavior 
towards an internal goal, and in the ongoing regulation of affective and cognitive processes 
during goal pursuit. The separate coding of sequence value specifically on first saving trials 
could reflect the initial formation of a plan, or a decision process that selects among alternative 
plans.  
Prospective activity in a different category of neurons coded the planned sequence length, 
thereby reflecting the means by which a distant reward would be obtained. These neurons did not 
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specify a movement plan—which was precluded by the experimental design using randomized 
cue positions—but an abstract, movement-independent plan based on the number of choice steps. 
Encoding behavioral plans in such abstract form seems advantageous for goal-directed behavior, 
as specific movement requirements are often not known in advance. These amygdala sequence 
length signals observed during economic, free choices may complement frontal lobe signals 
related to final target positions
8
 and categories of action sequences
9
 found in instructed tasks. 
The observed encoding of sequence length specifically on first trials is consistent with the 
updating of an internal behavioral plan, analogous to updating of externally cued motor plans 
seen in frontal cortex
10
.  
 
Planning activity and relation to other brain systems 
Consistent with classical concepts
43
, we suggest that amygdala planning activity provides 
directive inputs to frontal lobe-basal ganglia structures involved in sequential, self-initiated 
behavior
7-14
. Amygdala sequence value neurons could send a value or goal signal to striatal and 
frontal areas to influence the initial selection of a plan and guide ongoing behavior towards an 
internal, distant reward goal. Via the same routes, amygdala sequence length neurons may 
participate in transforming abstract, value-based plans into concrete action. Amygdala reward-
planning activity may also influence multi-step learning processes involving frontal-striatal
44
 and 
parietal areas
45
, and may complement prospective activity observed in rodent hippocampus 
during spatial navigation
46,47
. 
Existing evidence supports our interpretation that amygdala planning activity informs 
frontal-striatal systems during goal-directed behavior
16,19,26,27
. For example, in a recent study, 
value coding in primate orbitofrontal cortex during reward-based choice was diminished 
following amygdala lesions
48
. Notably, our data cannot determine whether planning activity 
originated locally within amygdala circuits or elsewhere; resolving this important issue will 
require further experimentation. 
 
Planning activity and amygdala function in affective state 
Some amygdala neurons combined planning activity with additional task-relevant 
variables, including trial-specific values and reward expectation (Supplementary Table 3, 
Supplementary Fig. 7). Via known amygdala outputs to basal forebrain, hypothalamus and 
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brain stem
23
, such hybrid neurons could be involved in regulating motivation, attention and 
affective state
21,33,40,49
, based on the animal’s current plan. By contrast, the ‘pure’ planning 
activity is unlikely to reflect these processes: First, planning activity often disappeared during 
instructed behavior, despite comparable reward timing and anticipation. Second, most planning 
activities were unrelated to reward proximity and expectation, which seems incompatible with 
general functions in motivation or attention. Finally, the functionally different profiles of 
planning activity—coding sequence value or sequence length, either throughout sequences or on 
initial trials—seem inconsistent with simple roles in reward expectation or arousal.  
Thus, most planning activities failed to show standard measures of reward expectation 
and related state value, attention and arousal
20,21,40
, and therefore appear to reflect the animal’s 
internal saving plan. Although pure planning activity seems unrelated to attention, its combined 
coding with single-trial values and reward expectation in hybrid neurons could serve to focus 
processing onto current plans, which may be important in reward-saving behavior as suggested 
by psychological and economic theories
1
. 
 
Amygdala planning activity at sequence start 
In a previous study, amygdala neurons signaled the start of behavioral sequences during 
forced, multi-step reward schedules
33
. Although we also found sequence onset responses in some 
neurons (17%), our typical planning activity failed to occur in forced, imperative trials and was 
largely restricted to free choices. Crucially, planning activity was based entirely on internally 
generated goals and associated saving plans, and the animals made own choices rather than 
follow cue instructions. Planning activity also reflected parametrically the key variables 
sequence value or sequence length; a generalized, non-parametric response to sequence onset 
was factored out by multiple regression. Further, in supplementary analyses, only few neurons (< 
5%) showed systematic trial-order dependent activity beyond first trials. 
Thus, although visually similar to activity in forced, multi-step reward schedules, our 
planning activity critically reflected the internal nature of the task. 
 
Planning activity and theories of amygdala function 
Current theories emphasize the amygdala’s capacity as a valuation structure to signal 
behavioral goals based on external cues and past experience
15-21
. Our data significantly extend 
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these accounts by demonstrating that amygdala goal representations can reflect internally 
generated goals for distant, future rewards. This finding is difficult to reconcile with the 
influential view of the amygdala as an impulsive, stimulus-bound system that signals immediate 
rewards in response to external cues
50—a view often used to interpret amygdala dysfunction in 
addiction and other disorders. By contrast, the presently described amygdala neurons signaled 
the prospect of internally generated, future rewards that became available only after multi-step 
planning. Such prospective activity typically disappeared during externally cued behavior, and 
its timecourse did not resemble simple reward expectation.  
We propose an updated view of the amygdala that incorporates a planning function for 
internally generated, distant reward goals. This conceptual advance may open up new avenues 
for understanding amygdala function in health and disease, including in addiction and other 
states with dysfunctional reward pursuit.  
 
Conclusion 
A basic principle underlying goal-directed behavior is the formation of an internal plan 
and its pursuit over successive steps. Our findings, experimentally focused on shorter timescales, 
demonstrate neuronal building blocks for these fundamental processes in the amygdala, although 
additional mechanisms are likely required for planned behavior over longer periods.  
As a valuation system, the amygdala seems predisposed to provide the goals for 
internally planned behavior. However, we do not believe the amygdala is unique in encoding 
reward-based plans. Our experimental approach—combining neurophysiology with an internally 
controlled, sequential reward-planning task—may help uncover reward-based planning activity 
in other brain structures and perhaps other species. 
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FIGURE LEGENDS 
 
Figure 1 Reward-saving behavior in monkeys. (a) Sequential saving task. Animals chose freely 
to save or spend reward and determined internally the length of each saving sequence. 
Consecutive save choices increased reward amounts (determined by interest rate); spend choice 
resulted in reward delivery. Sequences lasted up to 9 consecutive trials (~12 s cycle time/trial). 
(b) Saving behavior, reward increases, and subjective value functions for different interest rates. 
Bars: relative frequencies with which animals produced different sequences, combined across 
animals. Green curves: reward amounts for different sequences. Magenta: subjective values 
(normalized), combining choice frequencies with reward magnitudes. With highest interest rate, 
reward stagnated after seven trials; most neuronal recordings involved intermediate interest rates. 
(c) Monkeys adapted their saving behavior to interest rate. Linear regression of weighted mean 
sequence length on interest for main task (black, n = 17) and control test with uncued changes in 
interest (magenta, n = 9). Data combined across animals. (d) Linear regression of reaction time 
on final sequence length. Reaction times (equally populated bins pooled over animals and 
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interest rates, z-normalized within sessions) on spend trials (black, averaged over n = 3,033 
trials) and save trials (magenta, averaged over n = 8,500 trials) were shorter for longer sequences 
(i.e. higher rewards). (e) Logistic regression of trial-by-trial choices. Spend/save value: 
subjective value associated with spending/saving on current trial; sequence value: subjective 
sequence value (spend value on final trial). Bias: constant; Cue position: left/right save cue 
position; Juice/day: consumed juice; Monkey: animal identity. **P < 0.005, *P < 0.05; n.s. not 
significant. Error bars: s.e.m. 
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Figure 2 A single amygdala neuron with prospective activity that reflected the value of the 
monkey’s internal saving plan. (a) Activity during step-by-step saving depended on the final 
saving sequence that the animal eventually produced. Specifically, activity depended on the 
subjective value of the current sequence (‘sequence value’), which would only be achieved 
several trials ahead. Upper panels: activity (spike density functions) during three saving 
sequences of different lengths. Activity during fixation (yellow area) was highest for the 
sequence in which the monkey would eventually spend on the fifth trial, as this sequence had the 
highest subjective value (Imp/s: impulses per second; raster display: ticks indicate impulses, 
rows indicate trials). Lower panel: activity averages for all sequence lengths (e.g. light-pink 
activation indicates mean fixation activity for all five-trial sequences, averaged over trials one to 
five). Activity reflected sequence value (magenta curve, normalized), rather than linear sequence 
length or objective reward amount (green curve, normalized). Behaviorally derived sequence 
values reflected the animal’s preferences for different combinations of sequence length and final 
reward—five-trial sequences had the highest value as the monkey chose them most frequently. 
Saving sequences were freely determined by the animal; visual stimulation was constant across 
sequences. (b) Within-trial activity sorted according to sequence value (terciles). (c) Linear 
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regression of activity on sequence value. Different value levels resulted from different sequence 
lengths as shown in (a). (d) Multiple regression coefficients (betas ± s.e.m., Eq. 6). (e) Activity 
in the imperative task, when saving was instructed, did not reflect sequence value. 
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Figure 3 Different forms of planning activity in four single amygdala neurons. (a) Activity of 
this neuron, as in Fig. 2, reflected sequence value across all trials. Right panel: regression betas 
obtained by fitting Eq. 6 to neuronal activity. (b) Activity of this neuron at trial start before 
fixation (“Pre-fix period”) reflected sequence value specifically on the first trial of each sequence 
(bold colors), but not on subsequent trials (light colors). Right panel: regression betas obtained 
by fitting Eq. 8 to neuronal activity. First trial indicator: indicator variable for the first trial in a 
saving sequence. First trial indicator × sequence value: regressor for testing sequence value 
coding specifically on first saving trials. (Statistics for first-trial effects were based on data from 
all save trials including bold and light colored data. The linear regression in the middle panel 
remained significant when the effect of outliers was reduced using robust regression.) (c) 
Activity of this neuron during the fixation and cue periods reflected final sequence length, rather 
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than sequence value, across all saving trials. Activity was higher for shorter sequences. Right 
panel: regression betas obtained by fitting Eq. 7 to neuronal activity.  (d) Activity of this neuron 
in the fixation period reflected sequence length specifically on first saving trials. Right panel: 
regression betas obtained by fitting Eq. 9 to neuronal activity. First trial indicator × sequence 
length: regressor for testing sequence length coding specifically on first saving trials. 
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Figure 4 Planning activity in amygdala neurons: population data. (a,b) Planning activity (z-
normalized) of 72 neurons encoding sequence value across all trials or specifically on first trials. 
(b) Population activity (magenta, n = 93 responses) reflected sequence value (r
2 
= 0.91, P < 
0.0001, linear regression, n = 7) rather than sequence length (r
2
 = 0.38, P > 0.1). (c,b) Planning 
activity of 71 neurons encoding sequence length across all trials or specifically on first trials. (d) 
Population activity (magenta, n = 92 responses) reflected sequence length (r
2 
= 0.85, P = 0.0035, 
n = 7) rather than sequence value (r
2
= 0.14, P > 0.4). (e, f) Activity of neurons tested in the 
imperative task failed to reflect sequence value or sequence length when saving was instructed 
(data from 30 neurons encoding sequence value and 29 neurons encoding sequence length). (g) 
Regression betas for observed data (orange, n = 829 responses from 329 neurons, collapsed 
across sequence value and sequence length) and trial-shuffled data (black, scaled down 1,000 
times). The distribution of observed data was shifted towards higher positive and negative values 
(Kolmogorov-Smirnov test). (h) Histological reconstruction of 72 sequence value neurons and 
71 sequence length neurons. Green, white, pink, yellow and blue symbols: example neurons in 
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Fig. 2 and Fig. 3a–d, respectively. Collapsing across anterior-posterior dimension resulted in 
symbol overlap. (i) Proportion of neurons with planning activity (n = 123 neurons, collapsed 
across sequence value and sequence length) in basolateral and centromedial amygdala (P = 
0.005, χ2-test) and corresponding recording depths (reference: bregma). 
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Figure 5 Adaptation dynamics of planning activity, reward proximity control. (a) Sequence-by-
sequence adaptation in a single neuron encoding sequence length. Activity changes from spend 
to save trials (dashed lines) reflected changes in sequence length between successive sequences. 
Gray curves: sequence-averaged activity (thick line) and trial-by-trial activity (thin line). Green 
curve: sequence length. Blue curve: within-sequence reward proximity. Arrows: examples for 
activity changes scaling with sequence length changes. Colored boxes indicate sequences and 
corresponding lengths. (b) Linear regression of activity of the neuron in (a) on sequence length 
(left, n = 41), difference in length between subsequent sequences (ΔSequence length, middle, n = 
7), and reward proximity (right, n = 41). (c) Population data. Left: sequence value responses (n = 
61); activity changes at sequence transitions reflected changes in sequence value (linear 
regression). Middle: sequence length responses (n = 55); activity changes reflected changes in 
sequence length. Right: Population activity (sequence value and sequence length responses, n = 
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116) was unrelated to within-sequence reward proximity. (d) Regression betas for planning 
activity and reward proximity (n = 116 sequence value and sequence length responses, 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test). (e) Behavioral-neuronal adaptation in sequence value neurons. 
Upper: With a new testing session, planning activity adapted readily to current interest rate, in-
step with behavior (r = 0.82, P = 1.7 × 10
–4
; both Medians = 1, n = 61). Lower: Neurons 
typically reached adaptation criterion within the first sequence (Median = –3, implying adaption 
within 3 trials before end of first sequence, t60 = –10.17, P = 1.0 × 10
–14
, one-sample t-test). 
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Figure 6 Relationship between amygdala planning activity and behavioral performance. (a) 
Relationship to saving efficiency. Stronger planning activity (sign-corrected regression betas, 
collapsed across responses encoding sequence value or sequence length across all trials, n = 116) 
predicted behavioral saving efficiency (accumulated sequence value per unit time, normalized, 
linear regression). This effect was confirmed in a partial correlation analysis (P < 0.001) that 
factored out potential confounding variables. (b) Relationship to performance errors. Bars show 
regression betas (± s.e.m) from a population analysis (combining sequence value and sequence 
length responses, n = 116) for trials immediately preceding errors (Pre-), error trials (Error), and 
trials following errors (Post-). The relationship between activity and planning variables was 
significantly reduced on error trials, when the animals failed to progress towards their saving 
goal (t1453 = -2.69, P < 0.01, dependent-samples t-test comparing betas on pre-error and error 
trials), and subsequently reappeared after error correction (t1453 = 3.47, P < 0.001, dependent-
samples t-test comparing betas on error and post-error trials). 
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Table 1. Number of neurons with planning activity. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1: Neurons encoding the planning variables sequence value or sequence length across all trials in a saving sequence. 
Percentages calculated with respect to 181 neurons in animal A, 148 neurons in animal B, and 329 task-related 
neurons in both animals. Percentages are referenced to the number of neurons that were recorded because they were 
task-related, i.e. responsive to events in the saving task. 
2: Neurons encoding planning variables specifically on first saving trials.  
3: Neurons encoding planning variables either across all trials or specifically on first saving trials. The number of 
neurons in this column can be smaller than the row sum as some neurons showed multiple significant effects.  
  
 All trials
1
 First trials
2
 Combined
3
 
 Sequence 
value 
Sequence 
length 
Sequence 
value 
Sequence 
length 
Sequence 
value/length 
Animal A 27 (15%)  21 (12%) 20 (11%) 15 (8%) 66 (36%) 
Animal B 19 (13%) 24 (16%) 10 (7%) 18 (12%) 57 (39%) 
Total 46 (14%) 45 (14%) 30 (9%) 33 (10%) 123 (37%) 
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METHODS 
Neurophysiological recordings. All animal procedures conformed to US National Institutes of 
Health Guidelines and were approved by the Home Office of the United Kingdom. Experimental 
procedures for neurophysiological recordings from awake behaving macaque monkeys have 
previously been described
25,34,51
. Two adult male rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) weighing 9.2 
and 12.0 kg participated in the experiments. The number of animals used is typical for primate 
neurophysiology experiments. The animals had no history of participation in previous 
experiments. A head holder and a recording chamber were fixed to the skull under general 
anesthesia and aseptic conditions. We located the amygdala from bone marks on coronal and 
sagittal radiographs taken with a guide cannula and electrode inserted at a known coordinate in 
reference to the stereotaxically implanted chamber
52
. We recorded activity from single amygdala 
neurons from extracellular positions during task performance, using standard 
electrophysiological techniques including on-line visualization and threshold discrimination of 
neuronal impulses on oscilloscopes. We aimed to record representative neuronal samples from 
the dorsal, lateral, and basal amygdala. 
We sampled activity from about 700 amygdala neurons in exploratory tests with the 
reward-saving task. We recorded and saved the activity of neurons that appeared to respond to at 
least one task event during online inspection of several trials. This procedure resulted in a 
database of 329 neurons with task-related responses which we analyzed statistically. The number 
of neurons is similar to those reported in previous studies on primate amygdala
21,25
. We aimed to 
identify neurons that were generally task-responsive but did not screen selectively for planning 
activity. Accordingly, statements about the proportion of amygdala neurons with planning 
activity refer to the proportion of neurons that we found to be related to the behavioral events in 
the saving task. 
After completion of data collection, recording sites were marked with small electrolytic 
lesions (15–20 µA, 20–60 s). The animals received an overdose of pentobarbital sodium (90 
mg/kg iv) and were perfused with 4% paraformaldehyde in 0.1 M phosphate buffer through the 
left ventricle of the heart. Recording positions were reconstructed from 50-µm-thick, 
stereotaxically oriented coronal brain sections stained with cresyl violet. The histological 
reconstructions validated also the previously radiographically assessed anatomical position of the 
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amygdala in agreement with earlier reports
25,52
. For Fig. 4h,i, we collapsed recording sites from 
both monkeys spanning 3 mm in the anterior-posterior dimension onto the same coronal section. 
 
Behavioral task. On each trial (Fig. 1a) the monkey chose to either save the liquid reward that 
was available on that trial, which increased its magnitude by a variable ‘interest rate’, or spend 
the saved reward for immediate consumption. (The term ‘interest rate’ provides an intuitive 
description of the variable that governed increases in reward across save choices; this should not 
imply exact comparability with human economic saving.) The increase of reward magnitude 
over successive save choices was determined by a geometric series (Eq. 1) 
 
𝑥𝑛 = 𝑏 ∑ 𝑞
𝑖
𝑛−1
𝑖=0
 
 
with xn as reward magnitude on trial n, b as base rate of reward magnitude, and q as interest rate, 
resulting in geometric increases for higher interest rates. Different liquid volumes were delivered 
using different opening durations of the solenoid valve. Monkeys were free to produce saving 
sequences of various lengths, i.e. saving behavior was self-determined (following one required 
save choice per sequence). We found that in early stages of task training the animals were unable 
to drink more than 8 ml on a single trial. Accordingly, for the high interest rate condition (Fig. 
1b, upper panel) we adjusted the reward magnitude so that reward stagnated after 7 consecutive 
save trials at 8 ml. However, the animals were still free to produce longer saving sequences, i.e. 
we did not impose an upper limit on the sequence length. By the time of neuronal recordings, the 
animals only generated saving sequences that resulted in reward amounts that they could 
comfortably drink. The animals initiated trials by placing their hand on an immobile, touch-
sensitive key. The trial then started with an ocular fixation spot of 1.3° of visual angle at the 
center of the computer monitor. Animals were required to keep their gaze on the fixation spot at 
stimulus center within 2–4°. Eye position was monitored using an infrared eye tracking system at 
125 Hz (ETL200; ISCAN). At 1,500 ms plus mean of 500 ms (truncated exponential 
distribution) after fixation spot onset, the two save and spend visual stimuli of 7.0° appeared on 
the left and right side of the computer monitor (pseudorandomized). The cues were 
approximately similar in luminance. In different blocks of typically 40–100 consecutive trials, 
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different stimuli were used as save cues to indicate different interest rates. Animals indicated 
their choice with a saccade as soon as the visual cues appeared. The chosen stimulus was then 
replaced by a peripheral fixation spot of 7.0° of visual angle. After a delay period of 1,500 ms a 
color change of the peripheral fixation spot served as a ‘Go’ signal for the monkey to release the 
touch key. The release of the touch key was followed by the delivery of the reinforcer (an 
auditory or visual cue on save trials vs. a drop of juice reward on spend trials). For most 
recording sessions, we used an auditory cue as secondary reinforcer on save trials, which 
signaled successful trial completion without providing information about saved reward amount. 
Thus, animals had to track internally the accumulated reward amounts during saving behavior. 
Failures of key touch or fixation breaks were considered errors and resulted in trial cancellation. 
More than three sequential errors led to a pause in behavioral testing. Accumulated saved 
rewards were retained across error trials. The animals were overtrained by the time of neuronal 
recording and showed consistent, meaningful saving behavior for different interest rates without 
further signs of learning (Fig. 1b, Supplementary Fig. 1a,b).  
To provide an example of how rewards were calculated, consider a series of two 
successive save choices by the monkey with a base rate of reward b = 0.11 and interest rate q = 
1.5. On the second trial of the choice sequence, after the first save choice, reward R = 0.11 × (1 + 
1.5) = 0.275 ml. On the third trial, after two successive save choices, reward R = 0.11 × (1 + 1.5 
+ 1.5
2
) = 0.523 ml. 
Each neuron was typically tested with one to two different interest rates. The duration 
required for testing neurons with statistically sufficient numbers of trials in both free choice and 
imperative tasks usually precluded using more than two interest rates.  
 
Task training. We trained each animal during 3–4 months prior to neuronal recordings with the 
different visual stimuli and the different interest rates (300–400 trials/day, 5 days/week). 
Initially, the animals learned that responding to visual cues lead to reward delivery. We then 
introduced two different visual cues and taught the animals that choice of one of the cues lead to 
reward if the other cue had been chosen immediately before. This helped to train the animals to 
alternate choices between save and spend cues. We then introduced interest rates in the form of 
different save cues and the monkeys learned the underlying reward contingencies by sampling 
different sequence lengths. Thus, we did not shape the animals behavior towards producing 
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different sequence lengths at different interest rates. In parallel, we introduced imperative trials 
using the same cues with variable sequence lengths, with a small visual stimulus indicating the 
correct choice on each trial. We proceeded to neuronal recordings when performance in control 
tasks (see below) indicated that the animals adapted their choices to interest rate in a meaningful 
and flexible manner. 
 
Rewards. A computer-controlled solenoid valve delivered juice reward from a spout in front of 
the animal's mouth (valve opening time of 100 ms corresponding to 0.38 ml). For monkey A the 
base rate of reward magnitude, b from equation 1, was set to 0.11 ml for all sessions, for monkey 
B the base rate was set to 0.11 ml for half of the sessions and 0.13 ml for the other half of the 
sessions. The animal's tongue interrupted an infrared light beam below the adequately positioned 
spout. An optosensor monitored licking behavior with 0.5-ms resolution (STM Sensor 
Technology). 
 
Imperative Control Task. In this control task, saving behavior was not self-controlled by the 
animals but was externally determined. A small visual cue was presented next to either the save 
or the spend cue to indicate the correct choice on each trial that was otherwise identical to a free 
choice trial. We matched the ratio of save to spend trials between imperative and free choice task 
for a given monkey and interest rate. This made it possible for the monkeys to anticipate final 
saving outcomes, as confirmed by analysis of behavioral reaction times (Supplementary Fig. 
2d). 
 
Control task with uncued changes in interest rate. To test the extent to which the monkeys 
adapted their saving behavior to changes in the interest rate even when interest rates changed 
without notification, we performed, in behavioral testing sessions, a variant of the free choice 
saving task in which the interest rate varied without associated changes in the visual save cue 
(Fig. 1c, Supplementary Fig. 1e). In this control test, we introduced a new, unfamiliar save cue 
on each day and varied the interest rate without notification in blocks of 40–100 trials that were 
randomly interleaved. The save cue was fixed throughout a testing session and the animal had to 
keep track of the current interest rate. 
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Control task with fixed reward. To test whether the monkeys kept track of the amount of 
reward they had accumulated through consecutive save choices, we offered them, on randomly 
interspersed trials, a choice between the accumulated reward and fixed amounts indicated by pre-
trained visual cues (Supplementary Fig. 1f). 
 
Data analysis 
Description of saving behavior. We constructed distributions of the relative frequencies with 
which each animal produced saving sequences of specified length, separately for different 
interest rates. Figure 1b shows these frequency distributions averaged over animals for low (q = 
0.7), medium (q = 1.5) and high (q = 2.0) interest rates. Figure 1c shows weighted means of 
these distributions pooled over animals. For calculation of these weighted means, each relative 
choice frequency was weighted by its corresponding sequence length. Supplementary Fig.1a 
shows distributions separately for both animals and for various interest rates. 
 
Definition of subjective values. To model the animals’ saving behavior trial-by-trial, we derived 
estimates of the subjective values that the animals likely associated with saving sequences and 
save/spend choice options. For unbiased estimates, we used one half of the choice data within 
each monkey and interest rate to estimate subjective values and the other half for analysis. For 
each interest rate, we measured the relative spending frequency at each step in a saving sequence 
(Fig. 1b black), and multiplied it with the objective reward magnitude that would results from 
spending on that trial (Fig. 1b green curve), in order to account for differences in reward 
magnitude between interest rate conditions. This measure constituted the subjective value of 
spending on each trial ('spend value', Fig. 1b magenta curve). Thus, the subjective value for 
spending, SVspend, at a given point i in a saving sequence was defined as (Eq. 2) 
 
𝑆𝑉𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖 =  𝑃𝑖 𝑀𝑖, 
 
where 𝑃𝑖 is the probability with which the monkey produced a saving sequence of length i, and 𝑀𝑖 
is the objective reward magnitude in ml of juice that would result from spending at point i of the 
sequence length given the current interest rate. The spend value actually realized in a saving 
sequence constituted the value of the current sequence, which we labeled 'sequence value'. 
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Magenta curves in Fig. 1b show examples of subjective value functions for different interest 
rates. We defined the 'save value' for each trial as the average spend value that the animal could 
obtain in all future trials of that sequence. Accordingly, the save value for a given trial i not only 
depended on the spend value of the immediately following trial, SVi+1 but also on the spend 
values of other future trials of the current sequence (SVi+2, SVi+3 etc.) Thus, the subjective value 
SVsave for saving at a given point n in a save sequence was defined as (Eq. 3) 
 
𝑆𝑉𝑠𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑛 =  
1
𝑚 − 𝑛
∑ 𝑆𝑉𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖,
𝑚
𝑖=𝑛+1
 
 
with m defining the upper limit of the save sequence (given by the maximal observed sequence 
length for the monkey). Thus, spend value and save value reflected the animals’ trial-by-trial 
valuations, whereas sequence value constituted the value of the current saving sequence. 
 
Logistic regression analysis of choice data. To model the monkeys’ trial-by-trial choices we 
used a multiple logistic regression analysis with the following general linear model (GLM): 
 
GLM-1 (Eq. 4):  
 
y =0+1 SVspend+2 SVsave+3 Interest+4 Cue position+5 Juice/day+6 Monkey+ε, 
 
with y as trial-by-trial save-spend choice (1 indicating save choice and 0 indicating spend 
choice), SVspend and SVsave as the subjective value of spending or saving on the current trial, 
Interest as the current interest rate, Cue position as the left-right position of the save cue on the 
current trial, Juice/day as the amount of liquid already consumed on that day, Monkey as animal 
identity, 1 to 6 as the corresponding slope parameter estimates, 0 as constant and ε as residual. 
 
Linear regression analysis of reaction times and licking durations. As a measure of the 
animals’ trial-by-trial reward expectation, we analyzed the latencies with which the monkeys 
released the touch key at the end of the trial to initiate reinforcer delivery. We adopted this 
approach based on previous findings
53
 and preliminary analyses which indicated that touch key 
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release latencies rather than saccade latencies reflected upcoming reward magnitudes. Reaction 
times were z-normalized separately for each animal within each experimental session by 
subtracting the session mean and dividing by the session standard deviation. To test whether 
sequence value influenced the animals’ reaction times during saving, we used the following 
multiple regression model:  
 
GLM-2 (Eq. 5):  
 
y =0+1 Choice +2 SVspend+3 SVsave+4 SVfinal +5 Interest+6 Juice/day+7 Monkey+ε, 
 
with y as reaction time (key release latency) and SVfinal as sequence value (all other regressors 
as defined for Eq. 4). 
 
Analysis of neuronal data. We counted neuronal impulses in each neuron on correct trials 
relative to different task events with time windows that were fixed across neurons: 1,000 ms 
before fixation spot (Pre-fixation), 1,775 ms after fixation spot but before cues (Fixation, starting 
25 ms after fixation spot onset), 300 ms after cues (Cue, starting 20 ms after cue onset), 1,500 ms 
post-choice delay (Delay, starting 25 ms after the animal had indicated its choice), and 500 ms 
during the reward/outcome period (Outcome, starting 50 ms after reinforcer onset). Our analysis 
followed established approaches to analyze neuronal data in reward structures with 
heterogeneous populations of neurons35-37,54, as follows.  
We first identified task-related responses in individual neurons and then used multiple 
regression analysis to test for different forms of planning activity while controlling for the most 
important behaviorally relevant covariates. We identified task-related responses by comparing 
activity in the Fixation, Cue, Delay and Outcome periods to a control period (Pre-fixation) using 
the Wilcoxon test (P < 0.01, Bonferroni-corrected for multiple comparisons). A neuron was 
included as task-related if its activity in at least one task period was significantly different to that 
in the control period. Because the Pre-fixation period served as control period we did not select 
for task-relatedness in this period and included all neurons with observed impulses in the 
analysis. We chose the pre-fixation period as control period because it was the earliest period at 
the start of a trial in which no sensory stimuli were presented.  
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We next used multiple regression analysis to assess relationships between neuronal 
activity and planning variables. The use of multiple regression was considered appropriate for 
the present data after testing assumptions of randomness of residuals, constancy of variance, and 
normality of error terms. Statistical significance of regression coefficients was determined using 
t-test with P < 0.05 as criterion, and was supported by a bootstrap as described in the Results. All 
tests performed were two-sided. Each neuronal response was tested with the following multiple 
regression models: 
 
GLM-4a (Eq. 6):  
 
y =0+1 Choice +2 SVspend+3 SVsave+4 SVfinal +5 Left/right+6 Cue position+ε, 
 
GLM-4b (Eq. 7):  
 
y =0+1 Choice +2 SVspend+3 SVsave+4 SeqLength +5 Left/right+6 Cue position+ε, 
 
with y as trial-by-trial neuronal impulse rate, SVfinal as sequence value, SeqLength as sequence 
length and Left/right as an indicator function denoting whether the monkey made a saccade to 
the left or to the right (all other variables as defined above for GLM-2). GLM-4 was used to 
identify neurons whose activity reflected sequence value or sequence length across all trials 
within saving sequences. Coefficients for all regressors within a model were estimated 
simultaneously. Thus, significant regressors for sequence value or sequence length would 
indicate that a significant portion of the variation in neuronal impulse rate can be uniquely 
attributed to these variables. 
 The following models were used to test specifically for relationships between neuronal 
activity and planning activity on first saving trials. 
 
GLM-5a (Eq. 8): 
 
y =0+1 SVspend+2 SVsave+3 SVfinal+4 FirstSave+5 SVfinal×FirstSave +6 Cue 
position+ε 
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GLM-5b (Eq. 9): 
 
y =0+1 SVspend+2 SVsave+3 SeqLength+4 FirstSave+5 SeqLength×FirstSave +6 Cue 
position+ε, 
 
with y as the trial-by-trial neuronal impulse rate on all save trials (excluding spend trials), 
FirstSave as an indicator function denoting the first trial within each saving sequence, 
SVfinal×FirstSave as an interaction term to model sequence value coding specifically on first 
trials, and SeqLength×FirstSave as an interaction term to model sequence length coding 
specifically on first trials. To limit the number of regressors in the model, we only considered 
save trials for this analysis; therefore, GLM-5 did not include regressors for the trial-specific 
save-spend choice (which was constant). We also did not include a regressor for the current-trial 
left-right action as few neurons (< 5%) showed effects related to action choice in initial 
exploratory analysis. 
We analyzed all task-related responses with the GLMs described in Eq. 6-9 to test for 
significance of the regression coefficient related to planning activity in each model. A task-
related response was categorized as planning activity if it had a significant regressor for sequence 
value or sequence length in GLM-4 or in GLM-5. In cases were both sequence value and 
sequence length regressors were significant, we calculated coefficients of partial determination 
(CPDs)—a measure of the variance explained by one regressor in a multiple regression model—
and assigned the response to the category with the higher CPD. CPDs were calculated as 
CPD(Xi) = [SSE(X-i) – SSE(X-i, Xi)] / SSE(X-i), with SSE(X) indicating the sum of squared 
errors in a regression model that includes a set of regressors Xi, and X-i indicating the set of 
regressors that includes all regressors except Xi. For most planning activities (94.6%), this 
approach allowed clear categorization as either sequence value-coding or sequence length-
coding. Some remaining responses with equal CPDs (5.4%) were categorized as sequence value-
coding as this was our a priori hypothesis for a reward structure. Exclusion of these few 
ambiguous responses did not alter any results or conclusions. 
We followed standard procedures55,56 to confirm that our regression approach was not 
compromised by multicollinearity. First, we confirmed that our results were robust to variations 
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in statistical modelling when predictor variables were added or deleted (see below). Second, 
inspection of correlation matrices revealed that correlations between variables were within 
acceptable ranges (e.g. the average correlation between SVsave and SVspend was –0.178). 
Third, we confirmed that variance inflation factors (VIFs) for the behavioral GLMs were < 3, 
and thus well below the cut-off recommended in statistical literature56. For all neuronal GLMs, 
VIFs were equally low (Mean = 2.48 ± 0.13 s.e.m.) and 95% of VIFs were < 3.44 (VIFs 
calculated separately within each neuronal testing sessions). 
We evaluated the extent to which our key findings were robust to variations in statistical 
modeling using alternative analysis windows and regression models. Results for the fixation 
period were robust (< 5% change in number of significant responses) to changes in analysis 
window (200, 250, or 350 ms offset after fixation or restricting analysis window to 350 ms offset 
unril 1,500 ms post fixation). Further, compared to 123 neurons with planning activity obtained 
in our main regression models, we obtained the following numbers in a series of alternative 
models: 130 neurons when GLM-4 and GLM-5 were combined into one model, 125 neurons 
when including reward proximity as a covariate, 134 neurons when including reaction time as a 
covariate, 128 neurons when including an autoregressive term of neuronal impulse rate as 
covariate, 120 neurons when choice probability was included as covariate, and 115 neurons 
when using single linear regression models. Finally, a stepwise variable selection
55
 procedure 
with all variables in Eq. 6-9 included in the starting set identified 135 neurons with planning 
activity (Supplementary Table 1). 
 
Normalization of population activity. We subtracted from the measured impulse rate in a given 
task period the mean impulse rate of the control period and divided by the standard deviation of 
the control period (z-score normalization). Next, we distinguished neurons that showed a positive 
relationship to sequence value or sequence length and those with a negative relationship, based 
on the sign of the regression coefficient, and sign-corrected responses with a negative 
relationship.  
 
Normalization of regression coefficients. Standardized regression coefficients were defined as 
xi(si/sy), xi being the raw slope coefficient for regressor i, and si and sy the standard deviations of 
independent variable i and the dependent variable, respectively.  
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Analysis of neuronal adaptation dynamics. To examine behavioral and neuronal adaptation to 
the current interest rate at the start of a new testing session, we defined a criterion for behavioral 
adaptation as the number of sequences that the animal produced before it produced its ‘preferred’ 
sequence for the first time. The preferred sequence was the one with the highest sequence value 
given the current interest rate. Our rationale was that each interest rate condition was 
characterized by a subjective value function that depended on the animal’s choice preferences. 
The animals would then adapt to current interest rate by changing their behavior according to 
this value function, and corresponding changes might be seen in sequence value neurons. To 
examine neuronal adaptation in sequence value neurons, a criterion for neuronal adaptation was 
defined as the number of trials before the neuronal response to the preferred sequence was within 
0.5 s.d. of the neuron’s mean response to that sequence. (Very similar results were obtained if 
this criterion was adjusted to 1 or 1.5 standard deviations.) For all sequence value responses, the 
distribution of this neuronal adaptation criterion over sessions is plotted in Fig. 5e (upper panel, 
magenta data points represent means over responses). The lower panel in Fig. 5e shows the 
distribution of the difference between this criterion and the length of the preferred sequence. 
Thus, negative values on the x-axis in Fig. 5e, lower panel, indicate that the neuronal adaptation 
criterion was achieved during the first preferred sequence that the animal produced in that 
session. 
 
Analysis across neurons. For Fig. 6a, we plotted the sign-corrected, standardized regression 
betas for each neuronal response against a measure of saving efficiency, defined as the 
cumulative sequence value that the animal obtained in the session in which the neuron was 
recorded, normalized to the number of trials in that session. For the error analysis shown in Fig. 
6b, we selected trials immediately before the animal committed an error within a saving 
sequence (‘Pre-error’), the error trial itself (‘Error’) and the subsequent trial (‘Post-error’). Errors 
occurred when the animal failed to complete a trial due to a fixation error or release of touch key. 
We included trials on which an error occurred following the trial period in which the neuron 
exhibited planning activity. As this analysis matched the number of error and non-error trials, 
any observed effect could not be explained by lower statistical power for error trials. The 
regression coefficients shown in Fig. 6b were obtained by performing single linear regressions of 
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normalized population activity on sequence value or sequence length, separately for pre-error, 
error, and post-error trials. 
 
Analysis of neuronal tuning to sequence length. For the analysis shown in Supplementary 
Fig. 5, we calculated a breadth of tuning metric that has previously been used to examine sensory 
tuning functions
57
. We determined the relative magnitude of the neuronal response to a specific 
sequence length (defined as the mean response to that sequence length, expressed as the 
proportion of the summed mean responses to all sequences). Based on these relative magnitudes, 
the breadth of tuning metric was calculated as (Eq. 10) 
 
𝐻 = −𝐾 ∑ 𝑝𝑖 log 𝑝𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
 
with H as breadth of tuning, K as scaling constant (set so that H = 1.0 if the neuron had equal 
responses to all sequence lengths in the set of n sequence lengths), and pi as the response to a 
given sequence length, expressed as the proportion of the total (summed) response to all 
sequences. The set of sequences considered for each neuron was determined by the range of 
sequences that the animal produced while the neuron was recorded. The metric ranges from 0 to 
1.0, with 0 indicating total specificity to one sequence length and 1.0 indicating equal responses 
to all sequences. 
 
A Supplementary Methods Checklist is available. 
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